Harty p. 347-379; Dombrowski p. 121-151

Harty:

Communication Failures Contributing to the Challenger Accident: An Example for Technical Communicators

• managers and engineers viewing the same facts from different perspectives-suggests that knowledge is not simply seeing facts but rather interpreting them, and that interpretation varies depending upon one's vantage point. Communication isn't just shared information; it is shared interpretation. If sender and receiver are from different corporate subcultures achieving shared interpretation is more difficult.


• the general difficulty of either sending or receiving bad news, particularly when it must be passed to superiors or outsiders- research has repeatedly shown that bad news is often not pased upward in organizations. Even when bad news is sent, people are less likely to believe it than good news.

the three organizations seemd to view one another as outsiders despite the fact that they were working jointly on the same project-the taboo against airing organizational dirty linen in publi was added to the general difficulties of bad news transmission.

When O-ring anomalies first began appearing in early 1984, neither engineers nor management at MTI treated them as serious problems in their communications to Marshall.

• Internal MTI documents show that the contractor was examining the problems with little sense of urgency, again evidencing the tendency to see the problem in the best light possible.


• early signs of O-ring problems were generally not believed at MTI, were accepted at Marshall only when it was possible to see the problem as MTI's, and were not sent upward to NASA headquarters.

The optimistic view of the O-rings persisted at both MTI and Marshall over the 84-85 period despite mounting evidence that the rings were not functioning well.

• an optimistic interpretation of the data on cold was held by both engineers and managers at MTI. the split between managerial and engineering interpretation of the data did not develop for four or five more months.


• the very frequency of the problem could have added to its acceptability because the damage kept occurring with no serious consequences.


• in July 1985, a launch constraint was placed on the nozzle joints. this meant that no other flights would take place until O-ring erosion at the nozzle joint had been fixed or shown not to be a problem. but it was waived for every subsequent flight.

concern was evidenced by both the way Boisjoly faults his own company and by his use of emotional language unusual in engineering documents. although he was sufficienly alarmed to try to reach his superiors, he still attempted to keep bad news from the prying eyes of outsiders.

• the memo did not communicate its intent b/c the people who read it were uncertain of its meaning. "There were a whole lot of people who weren't smart enough to look behind the veil and say 'Gee, I wonder what this means'". pg. 357


• MTI engineers concluded that the O-ring problems were serious before their management did. However, in their written communication, they varied the extent to which they voiced that seriousness, depending on whether their audience was internal or external.

although the taks force members regarded their work as urgent, administrators required that all testing and design be done according to routines established for more leisurely long-term development.

• in general, Marshall challenged, not MTI's facts, but the conclusions drawn from them.


• MTI was split along role lines-the engineers continued to argue against launch.

a number of precautions engineers and their managers might take in the face of the same kind of pressure-induced miscommunication.

• from a manager's point of view, one of the most important precautions is to establish an atmosphere in which engineers feel free to communicate bad news as well as good.


• pressures for holding back bad news should be anticipated to be especially strong when contractors are involved. contracts can be designed to lessen this fear, but those issuing the contracts should be alert for any sign of problems, since full disclosure of bad news is unlikely in this situation.


• managers and engineers alike should anticipate that they are probably erring on the side of optimism in interpreting data bearing on already established designs and programs. failure to believe bad news is probably caused by a number of factors, including reluctance to admit that one was wrong, fear of practical consequences such as expensive redesign, and a kind of intellectual inertia that makes it easier to persist in an already established belief than to change it.

How to lie with statistics:

• the sample with built-in bias: to be dependable to any useful degree at all, a sampling study must use a representative sample (which can lead to trouble too) or a truly random one. The test is this: does every name in the group have an equal chance to be in the sample?


• the truncated, or gee-whiz, graph: if you don't mind misleading the hasty looker, or if you quite clearly want to deceive him, you can save some space by chopping the bottom off many kinds of graphs.


• the souped-up graph: simple change the proportion between the ordinate and the abscissa.


• the well-chosen average: it is not that one type of average is invariably better than the other; it depends upon what you are talking about. but neither gives you any real information-and either may be highly misleading-unless you know which of those two kinds of average it is.


• the insignificant difference of the elusive error: the rule is that you cannot make a valid comparison between two figures unless you know the deviations. and unless the difference between the figures is many times greater than the probable error of each, you have only a guess that the one appearing greater really is.


• the one-dimensional picture


• the ever-impressive decimal: for a spurious air of precision that will lend all kinds of weight to the most disreputable statistics, consider the decimal.


• the semiattached figure: if you can't prove what you want to prove, demonstrate something else and pretend that they are the same thing.


• the unwarranted assumption, or post hoc rides again: the interrelation of cause and effect, so often obscure anyway, can be most nearly hidden in statistical data.

Determining the Ethics of Style:

• indeed, most doublespeak is the product of clear thinking and is carefully designed and constructed to appear to communicate when in fact it doesn't.


• sometimes we want to be unclear. we don't know what we're talking about, and we don't want anyone else to know that. or we do know what we're talking about, and we don't want anyone else to know what we know.

The ten commandments of computer ethics p. 370-371

developing ethical guidelines for technical communicators parallels the challenges of doing so for computer professionals and engineers-obligations to society, to their employers, to their clients, and to coprofessionals and even professional organizations.

STC ethical guidelines for technical communicators: legality, honesty, confidentiality, quality, fairness, and profesionalism.

codes help to establish an atmosphere of professionalism, and they help to encourage members of a profession to act ethically even in the most difficult of circumstances.

Legal and ethical issues in editing: editors work with other members of product development teams and legal experts to verify adherence to these laws and the representation of them in the text through warnings and notices of copyright, trademarks or patents.

codes of ethics aim to protect individuals and groups from harm and to provide opportunities by creating a work environment in which individuals can achieve.

editors can be most effective as individuals if corporate policies establish commitment to legal and ethical behavior and if corporate procedures allow for review of products and documents by a variety of knowledgeable people, not just the editor or even just the legal department.

intellectual property includes original works of fiction or nonfiction, artwork and photographs, recordings, computer programs, and any other expression that is fixed in some form-printed, recorded or posted on the internet. includes work protected as trademarks, patents and trade secrets.

copyright: the US Copyright Act of 1976 protects authors of "original works of authorship," whether or not the works are published. the owner of a copyright has the right to reproduce and distribute the work and to prepare derivitative works based on the copyrighted work.

• copyright belongs to the author who created the work unless the author wrote the work to meet responsibilites of employment; material is then the propertyu of the employer. Works by the US government aren't eligible for copyright protection-public domain. Collections with contributions by multiple authors are generally protected by a single copyright, but the sections may be copyrighted individually.


• copyright extends 70 years beyond the owner's death. works written for hire are protected 95 years beyond publication.


• copyright is automatic in the US as soon as the work exists in fixed form and protection doesn't require a notice or registration. for the best protection, a published work should contain a notice of copyright.


• copyright in one country doesn't automatically extend to another; use depends on laws of country.

Usually the writer requests permission from the copyright holder, but editors verify that permissions have been acquired before the document goes to print. the permission ought to exist in writing-title, author, and edition of the materials to be reprinted; exact material to be used; how it will be used.

• fair use allows some copying for educational or other noncommercial purposes.


• copyright prohibits duplication of software for multiple users unless an organization has purchased a site license.

material on the web and even emails are protected by the same copyright laws that protect print, especially when the information has commercial value. cyberspace law is an area that is still developing.

trademarks are brand names, phrases, graphics, or logos that identify products. if the marks are registered with the US Patent and Trademark Office, no one else can use those particular marks to represent their own products.

it is illegal for a company to hire you to find out what a competitot is planning, and it is illegal for you to give trade secrets of a former employer to a new employer or of your current employer to anyone else.

According to US law, companies and individuals must assume responsibility for safety of the products as they are used or even misused by consumers. Manufacturers cannot avoid responsibility with disclaimers.

• the first strategy of documenting safe use of a product is to write clear and complete instructions; summary of hazards. taking the perspective of the reader, the editor may note some gaps that a writer missed. If there are hazards of using products, manufacturers and suppliers must warn of the risks unless the product is common and its hazards well known. Safety labels should be attached to products where users will see them before and as they use the product.
• Writers and editors have some responsibility in the eyes of the law for safe use of a product.

The possibility of being sued forlibel worries editors of fiction and periodicals more than it does technical editors b/c people are more likely to be discussed, referred to, or otherwise cited in works of fiction and in periodicals than in technical documents.

Dombrowski

Challenger investigations demonstrate the critical importance of clear communications in highly technical systems such as the shuttle, the powerful role of complex social forces in shaping communications, and the close interplay between values and language in communication. Show how ethical responsibility can be reflected in highly technical documents and how differences in organizational power can negate even the most ethically responsible of technical communications. Finally, ethical assessment of real organizational and technical issues often is very complicated, difficult, and innately problematic.

The report of the commission appointed by the president (the Rogers Commission) provides important insights into the way that ethics plays an important role in technical communication. It shows difficulties in its proportions, its focus and emphasis, and its languages. Also points out difficulties of clarity, purpose, and aims.

• relevance is often weak and only tenuously expressed.
• the proportions of the presidential commission's report are lopsided, leaving the misleading impression on the reader that the matters covered at substantial length are of substantial importance (escape system and landing options and the tire and braking system)
• three possibilites: the disproportion was entirely unconscious and unintended; the writers could have chosen to include all the information they collected regardless of the strength of its relevance in order to convince the readers that they had conducted a thorough investigation; the writers could have included a great amount of information in order to leave the impression that all these factors played significant roles, that none was markedly more significant that any others, and that no causative factor could fairly be singled out as more important than others.
• the great mass of information was presented partly in order to mislead or at least to complicate rather than clarify-divert attention from specific instances of poor judgment or negligence.

The presidential report differs from the congressional report in its focus, in its conclusions and recommendations, and especially in its unwillingness to assign ethical responsibility.

More than information:

• the differences center around ethical responsibility, which strongly suggests that this area is a very real crux in understanding the disaster.
• the congressional and presidential panels considered almost the same body of information yet came to different conclusions. the evidence and testimony were almost identical.

confusing language:

• the conclusions and recommendations sections of the presidential commission's report, the vital heart of the document, show problems of language and conceptualization.
• did someone fail to do something required by procedures, or did everyone do what was required by an inadequate system of procedures, or was the course of action chosen on the basis of available information actually incorrect and unwarrented. the reader has to sort out the correct meaning.

conclusions don't follow logically:

• the presidential report fails to address clearly and squarely the question of ethical responsibilities.
• the conclusions and recommendations don't point a finger of ethical blame toward anyone regarding any particular persons or decisions. the evidence and testimony suggest that some ethical responsibilities were not fulfilled.
• the recommendations section recommends that procedures be instituted in order to prevent similar disasters in the future, even though the evidence and testimony clearly indicate that the procedures in place were already adequate.
• the implicit suggestion left by this call for more, new procedures is that the procedures were at fault or to blame.
• the congressional report is explicit and clear-not "blaming" the procedures but in assigning responsibility to people. uses consistent terminology and precise language.

in two vitally important instances, a shift in meaning occurred having to do with the communication of technical information.

• over the course of several years, the cause for alarm became reconceptualized, incredibly, as a cause for reassurance of safety-every new instance of charring was taken as confirming that flights can proceed without incident regardless of charring.
• the raw data remained the same, whereas the representation of what this information meant, how it was to be interpreted, or what should be done in light of it changed totally.
• the powerful influence of the entire collection of social forces over a long period of time. it completely reshaped the attitudes and interpretations of a whole population of bright, earnest people without their even being fully aware of any change.

the engineer's communications, both prior to and during the meeting, show how technical communication can be done excellently yet still be nullified by extraneous but more powerful organizational considerations. there was no change of objective information whatsoever, only a change of perspectives and values.

• the engineers could not have effectively persuaded managers not to launch because the managers had alread decided what they were going to do.

when the writer has done responsibly all that can reasonably be done to write effectively and persuasively, then the burden of responsibility must shift to the readers.

Aristotle: clearly commend him as completely ethical in insisting on the good, true, and right. the ambiguous, confusing language of the presidential commission's report and its unwillingness to focus on personal responsibility would not warrant being called ethical.

Kant: Boisjoly obviously accepted and enacted his ethical responsibilities even though he was communicating a message that his audience did not want to read or hear; suffered for doing his duty. the congressional committee clearly accepted their responsibility for doing what they though ethically best. the presidential commission, on the other hand, seems to have deliberately avoided focusing on personal ethical responsibility.

Utilitarianism: the near-certainty that some astronauts will die at some time is outweighed by the greater good to the greater society of advancing the technology, exploring the unknown, adding to scientific knowledge, and maintaining national security. the ethical rub is that some astronauts were being exposed to greater risk than they were aware of and to risks that could have been minimized. the presidential commission was avoiding addressing ethical personal responsibility out of a concern for the greater good. the congressional committee disagreed.

feminist and ethics of care: caring concern for others would require that those involved in communicating and making decisions about the Challenger mission do so with the safety of the crew paramount in mind.